At the same time, few question prevailing notions of Schmidt as too arrogantly unpolitical for his own good, someone who could often not even pretend to empathize with the angst of his party's rank and file or with the unease of the broader public—though this apparent indifference barely dented the high ratings he enjoyed in opinion polls throughout his career and long afterward. Kohl, in particular, combined this status-quoist approach with cash-fueled cronyism, lending credence to charges that a complacent, self-interested political elite held sway in Germany. The train may be easier and avoids potential traffic, takes approximately 40-50 minutes, costs between NT$43 - NT$66, and arrives at Taipei Main Station. Helmut Kohl was a great European, as well as a German nationalist, who brilliantly managed to reconcile European and national identities. Taken together, the contributions to this forum have a number of other features in common. In this sense, they were both products of Germany's particular “1945” generation, which regarded European unification as a sharp break with Germany's troubled past and thus as a core part of the nascent Federal Republic's new postwar international identity. Three months later, Kohl was on track to be the Chancellor of Unity, and his critics (with the notable exception of Geißler) made their peace with his continued leadership. At a time when the Americans were hanging back, he came up with the funds to buy Mikhail Gorbachev's support for unified Germany to remain in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and for the rapid withdrawal of the Red Army from German soil. Would he have opted for a genuinely pan-European security system, rather than for an eastward extension of NATO? 21 Schwarz, Hans Peter, Helmut Kohl. Pivotal in all this was the defection of his coalition partner and foreign minister: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the leader of the Free Democrats, who went on to serve Kohl in the same capacity until 1992. 42 On the difference between historism and historicism, see Berger, Stefan, The Search for Normality: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Germany since 1800 (New York: Berghahn, 1997), 3. In dealing with France, he aligned himself consciously with the principles of Westbindung and self-restraint laid down by Konrad Adenauer in the 1950s. Personal relationships were central to Kohl's diplomacy. Given how conditions in former communist East Germany differed from those of the Federal Republic in his youth, the landscape there did not “blossom” as quickly or completely after 1990 as he had expected; governing by historical analogy had its pitfalls. This view contrasts with the still popular notion that there was, on his watch, a dramatic change at the domestic level and the creation of a “new world order” on the international level. At a special CSU conference held in Kreuth in November 1976, Strauß announced a decision to break the existing relationship between the two parties. Total loading time: 0 But this, too, is not entirely suprising or unwarranted: after all, as Clemens observes, both politicians saw their actions in that arena as their “main legacy.”, Taken together, the contributions to this forum have a number of other features in common. 24 For a more extensive treatment, see Haeussler, Mathias, “The Convictions of a Realist: Concepts of ‘Solidarity’ in Helmut Schmidt's European Thought, 1945–82,” European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire 24, no. On one side of the ledger is, of course, his drive to reunify Germany, an achievement on an order of magnitude all its own. And, in its obituary for Schmidt, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung concluded that the “achievements of his political life [politische Lebensleistung] fell short of the heights attained by Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl.” What these judgments really reveal is the essentially parochial and partisan framework in which such appraisals tend to be formulated in the Federal Republic. He was creative in his responses, forging a partnership with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing that helped create the G7, rolling the dice on sending the elite unit Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG 9) to Mogadishu. An internal rebellion had been planned by his colleagues Heiner Geißler, Lothar Späth, and Rita Süssmuth at the party convention in Bremen. His party was split over the deployment of new missiles and Kohl was able to bring Schmidt down in a vote of no-confidence. What Kohl and his fellow European leaders did not do was produce plausible pan-European options, despite calls for such options from a wide variety of persons living on the Eurasian continent (i.e., not just East Europeans but also inhabitants of the former Soviet republics). The belief that a “new world order” emerged is surprisingly durable, despite the renewal of Cold-War-esque tensions between the West and Moscow in recent years. After all, one can only do great things if one is able to get into and stay in office. But his consistency that decade in pursuit of both reunification and European integration was remarkable. deidesheimer hof deidesheim • deidesheimer hof deidesheim photos • deidesheimer hof deidesheim location • deidesheimer hof deidesheim address • deidesheimer hof . To mark their recent deaths (Schmidt in November 2015, Kohl in June 2017), Central European History invited a half dozen experts—five historians and one political scientist, all based in the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands—to comment on the lives, legacies, and historical impact of these two major political figures. 10 Schmidt, Helmut, Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen (Berlin: Siedler, 1996), 251–52, 306. He always sought contact through one-on-one discussions, but he also liked small fora that facilitated direct dialogue and private, frank exchanges—keywords in his diplomatic lexicon. Die Sozialdemokraten und der Nachrüstungsstreit (1977–1987), http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=11199, www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/2010-2015/2015/11/150-2-kissinger-staatsakt.html, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/08888.pdf, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20170629IPR78645/farewell-to-honorary-european-citizen-helmut-kohl. He failed to recognize the signs of the times and could not bring himself to give way gracefully to a successor. From the 1970s to 1989, conventional wisdom held that maintenance of a divided world was the best one could hope for, whereas speaking of transcending the Cold War order was considered to be irresponsible, unrealistic, and dangerous. Out of this came the new “Friendship Treaty” with Moscow in September 1990, which put relations on a new footing. The Deidesheim treatment simply did not work with her: she could not get back fast enough to London. Die Sozialdemokraten und der Nachrüstungsstreit (1977–1987) (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2016). He felt comfortable deploying the traditional repertoire of provincial male bonding—be it over Riesling and Saumagen (pig's stomach) at the Deidesheimer Hof in his beloved Palatinate Heimat, or sweltering in a Siberian sauna and knocking back a few vodkas with Yeltsin. For most, he remains the decisive, pragmatic Macher, with unmatched skills at managing crises, both domestic and foreign; the chain-smoking intellectual with broad economic and defense expertise; and the Renaissance man, a gifted writer and artist. 3 (2017): 375–403. 33 Habermas, Jürgen, Die Normalität einer Berliner Republik (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1995). In 1989, Thatcher's visit to Kohl's home region clearly demonstrated that he did not entirely succeed in solving the tension between his self-representations as provincial German and great European, and that neither category is necessarily desirable to everyone. The two Helmuts were thus, in this sense, both products of the very particular historical context of Cold War West Germany—an artificial and provisional construct that has now, like the two Helmuts, faded into history. Kohl always praised the Federal Republic's integration with the West (Westbindung), a primary policy pursuit of his hero, Konrad Adenauer. But he also appreciated the need for speed to exploit a very narrow window of opportunity, taking account of the fortuitous conjunction of George H. W. Bush's support and Mikhail Gorbachev's acquiescence. Between them, the chancellorships of the “two Helmuts” span nearly a quarter-century of German history. Helmut Kohl, (born April 3, 1930, Ludwigshafen am Rhein, Germany—died June 16, 2017, Ludwigshafen am Rhein), German politician who served as chancellor of West Germany from 1982 to 1990 and of the reunified German nation from 1990 to 1998. Schmidt became chancellor only because of Willy Brandt's ignominious fall; he did not gain a personal mandate until the elections of 1976 and, because of his predecessor's iconic status in the Social Democrat Party (SPD), he never assumed the party chairmanship. This sheds light on the deep interconnectedness between European integration and the German question after 1945. Summits, he believed, should not just allow leaders to articulate their national positions; they should also encourage the working out of shared interests, compromises, and projected common actions—irrespective of the quality of the personal relationships around the table. Ultimately, however, his political accomplishments dwarfed those of his contemporaries. Bei Wein und Saumagen. He was, as one US commentator observed in 1990, “the father of the INF deployment and godfather of the INF treaty.”Footnote 9 Of course, there was no simple linear path from the signing of the treaty to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but defusing the Cold War in 1987 was surely an important precondition for the peaceful resolution of the German question. Was something new and different at all possible? 46 Charap, Samuel and Colton, Timothy, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia (London: Routledge, 2017). 48 For an English translation, see “In Spite of It All, America,” New York Times, Oct. 11, 2017. Questioning the historical legitimacy of the German nation and its right to be unified was as much a taboo for him as a revival of German nationalism—as if the latter had mysteriously disappeared after 1945. Finally, the participants all seem to agree (with Zhou Enlai in a much different context…) that it is still too early to judge what the legacies of the “two Helmuts” will be. As a result, it may not have been a given that a resentful Russian autocrat would one day emerge as leader—that was predominantly the function of internal Russian politics—but once one did in the person of Vladimir Putin, the persistence of a kind of de facto front line in Europe provided Putin with a ready source of grievance. 2 (2013): 141–62. M ost observers would likely agree, regardless of political couleur, that the Federal Republic of 1998—Helmut Kohl's final year as chancellor—was, in most respects, a much different country from the Federal Republic of 1974, the year that his immediate predecessor, Helmut Schmidt, assumed the reigns of political power. Schmidt, by contrast, came to office with a reputation for high administrative competence and intellectual prowess, but left the chancellery under a cloud. The success of the Federal Republic in the postwar era was, for Kohl, an important step toward normality; the latter could only be achieved, however, once territorial division and the historical “culture of shame” had been overcome. And, with some justice, he saw the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987—in which, for the first time, the superpowers agreed to reduce their armaments and even abolish an entire category of nuclear weapons—as the triumphant culmination of the “track two” agreement of 1979. In this regard, it is also telling that both Helmuts consciously put the Franco-German relationship at the center of their visions of Europe. As one of the EU's only three “Honorary Citizens of Europe” (the others are Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors), Kohl's credentials as one of Europe's major postwar statesmen can hardly be disputed. Kohl explained his political views as flowing from his Catholic upbringing, as well as from his parents and his clerical mentors, who had introduced him to politics. It is one of the fascinating aspects of the 1970s, a decade in which many social and geopolitical transformations began, that the leaders of the so-called great powers achieved their greatest accomplishments in maintaining the status quo. The rest of the story is familiar: Kohl not only became chancellor, but also held the job longer than anyone else has (so far). Helmut Kohl's Ethnocultural Representation of his Nation and Himself,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 19, no. Coming, respectively, during the election campaign and then presidency of Donald Trump, their passing highlighted in a particularly clear way a significant contrast: between a past marked by strong transatlantic cooperation, which endured despite numerous challenges, and a present marked by the assault of the Trump administration not only on transatlantic cooperation but also on many other cooperative international ventures. This certainly did the Federal Republic no harm, particularly in light of the country's unique historical burden and the widespread distrust that it awakened in Europe and beyond. Deidesheimer Hof | 1 “Dreizehn Jahre geliehene Macht (I),” Der Spiegel, Sept. 27, 1982; “Kanzler Schmidt: Hoffen auf den Macher,” Der Spiegel, May 13, 1974. Log In English Español Русский Français Deutsch Ladin, lingua ladina Where: Find: Home Germany Deidesheim, Rhineland-Palatinate Deidesheimer Hof Deidesheimer Hof Add to wishlist Add to compare Share Le Chancelier Helmut Schmidt et la France (Berne: Peter Lang, 1993); Waechter, Matthias, Helmut Schmidt und Valéry Giscard d'Estaing: Auf der Suche nach Stabilität in der Krise der 70er Jahre (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2011). Cutting an appropriate public figure matters quite a bit, but here as well Helmut Schmidt reminds us that even the most urbane presentation on the international parquet (or the most metaphorically ideal self-presentation as a capable helmsman) is no guarantee of longevity in office. Was his commitment to reunification and European integration visionary, or just the result of an unwillingness to imagine alternatives? Such paths are hidden from contemporaries, even from such wise and thoughtful statesmen as Helmut Schmidt. ที่เที่ยวไทเป | Huashan 1914 Creative Park. Perhaps his most relevant accomplishment was the way that, at what might arguably have been a high point of nationalist fervor—namely, the reunification of Germany in 1989–1990—he managed to contain that nationalist moment within the existing transatlantic framework, rather than letting the processes of unification escape that framework, or even eviscerate it. Kohl was equally adept at handling the wider international setting of German diplomacy. 50 Möller, Horst, Franz Josef Strauß: Herrscher und Rebell (Munich: Piper Verlag, 2015), 518–19. Indeed, it precipitated his fall from office. Clemens refers to “a certain idea of Europe” that Kohl believed in, and this idea was closely connected to his romantic notion of Heimat, consisting of cultural entities that existed within the nation but that also transcended the nation. Map of the USA: New York, San Francisco, Washington. Ignoring the lesson of his political idol, Adenauer, he refused to hand over the reins to a designated successor during his final term, unwisely insisting on standing for election one more time in 1998, when he suffered an embarrassing defeat. They all go beyond the prevailing hoary stereotypes—Schmidt as a “pragmatic” and “rational” Macher, Kohl as someone driven by more “emotive” considerations; they argue, furthermore, that the approaches and policies of the two men were more similar, in the end, than commonly assumed. Historians who take the (perfectly defensible) position that Helmut Schmidt was objectively a better qualified chancellor than Helmut Kohl end up sighing that the combination of internal SPD intrigues and FDP perfidy robbed him of his chance to achieve greater historical accomplishments. But the chancellors engaged with these issues from somewhat different outlooks: Kohl's internationalism was rooted, like Adenauer's, in his Rhine Heimat, on the historic borderlands of France and Germany, and amid the rich heritage of Catholic Christendom. Kohl's public self-narration as the ideal German drew on a relatively consistent self-portrait that he constructed throughout his political life. This republic represents, in many ways, the country's journey toward “normality” that Jürgen Habermas presaged while Kohl was still in office.Footnote 33 Germany has again become a nation-state with the same capital city it had between 1871 and 1945. It looks as if Kohl has won his historical battle for German normality! Has data issue: false Again, nostalgia was his lodestone. Der Spiegel spoke for many commentators when it dismissed him as a “good chancellor with a bad record”; few features of his period in office stood out as “proof of success.” Schmidt, it was said, had been a mere crisis manager and “problem-solver” (Macher) who lacked broader vision, so that “little endured of historical significance.”Footnote 1 This has also been the verdict of many historians.Footnote 2. 11 See Kissinger's address at the state ceremony for Schmidt on Nov. 23, 2015 in Hamburg: www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/2010-2015/2015/11/150-2-kissinger-staatsakt.html. Kohl was also very conscious of the challenges that German unity posed for the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation. Schmidt and Kohl, as all the contributions underline, were both staunch German patriots, pained by war and by division. Even on the Western side of the former iron curtain, the 2016 British “Brexit” vote to leave the European Union offers a potent contemporary reminder that German narratives of European integration have never been universally popular among some of the older member-states either. Each of the participants—Clayton Clemens, Ronald Granieri, Mathias Haeussler, Mary Elise Sarotte, Kristina Spohr, and Christian Wicke—was given wide latitude to approach this cluster of issues and themes in any way he or she saw fit, but the results are still, in some ways, surprising. In both cases, for example, the commitment to the European project was a direct result of the chancellors' political maturation in the immediate postwar years, whether expressed in Kohl's highly emotive attachment to the European cause or in Schmidt's cool-headed calculations of postwar Germany's national interests. Whereas Nazism remained very much alive in history and public memory, he perceived East Germany as an active threat in the ongoing political battle over the prerogative of historical interpretation. Divided and semi-sovereign postwar West Germany always had precious little wiggle room, despite the country's postwar economic ascent and the occasionally pushy personal diplomacy of Schmidt and Kohl. They hoped to depose Kohl as CDU chair in preparation for the next elections, scheduled for 1991. Wolkenstein, Fabio France Paris. Precisely because it lacked a rigidly narrow structure, his syncretic nationalism—Catholic and liberal—could have broad appeal and coexist with European federalism. Unlike Kissinger, who was a “realist” focused on the balance of power, Schmidt married geopolitical with geoeconomic thinking.Footnote 13 He was acutely aware of the historical sensitivities of involving himself in expressly global (not just European) affairs, yet he did not shrink from using the word Weltpolitik—a word which, for many, still recalled the dangerous provocations of the Wilhelmine era and the Nazi period. By contrast, Kohl's stock has fluctuated: the eager reformer of 1970, who opened his party to dialogue with intellectuals, became the provincial buffoon ill-equipped for high office by 1980. This has been noted by several participants in this forum. As the public debate mounted, and Kohl refused to rise to the bait, Strauß became increasingly agitated, leading to his unannounced arrival at a meeting of the CSU youth wing in Munich in late November. To be sure, they came from different generations. Though Kohl's European policies as chancellor may have lacked some strategic consistency, he was clearly not blind to the advantages of utilizing the European project for the pursuit of national interests: after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he tried to alleviate French fears of a revival of German power by embedding reunified Germany firmly within a revived and more closely integrated European Union.Footnote 22. Critics might worry that it provided cover for a reactionary conservatism and that it relativized Nazi-era crimes, but reunification and the consolidation of a “Berlin Republic” ultimately sealed his place in history. Entering political life in the shadow of some of the biggest personalities of modern German political history, he often appeared overmatched. This is doubtful, though I certainly agree with Kristina Spohr that Schmidt grasped the implications of the 1970s wave of globalization earlier and perhaps more fully than most of his contemporaries. On closer inspection, the “two Helmuts” were not as far apart over Europe as it might have seemed at times. Schmidt, by contrast, had been defence minister (1969–1972) and then economics and finance minister (1972–1974), and he brought to bear on both offices real expertise as a public intellectual. 4 (2013): 455–80. Hours: Lunch is served until 2 p.m. Dinner begins at about 6:30 p.m. 14 Spohr, Kristina, The Global Chancellor: Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). His German Heimat was not supposed to be a multicultural homeland. Deidesheimer Hof, Deidesheim: See 477 unbiased reviews of Deidesheimer Hof, rated 4 of 5 on Tripadvisor and ranked #7 of 35 restaurants in Deidesheim. Biographers often choose to write about persons whom they admire, driven by an interest in particularly positive historical examples. And, as Mathias Haeussler and Clay Clemens remark, they were also internationalists, committed to both European integration and the Atlantic alliance. For one, only half the contributors consider both chancellors in their initial statements, whereas the other three focus almost exclusively on Kohl. Even those who credit Mikhail Gorbachev for the conditions that had made it possible—or who praise Genscher, Brandt, and others for helping to reassure the world—rarely deny that it was, above all, Kohl who single-mindedly exploited the opportunity to overcome his nation's partition. This does not imply dismantling or dismissing Schmidt's or Kohl's contributions to the European cause, but rather to treat them as crucial parts of a diverse postwar discourse over European integration—an intellectual history that had always been shaped by many competing narratives and visions.Footnote 32 In this sense, Kohl's and Schmidt's personal histories reveal a great deal about the role and importance of the European project in postwar Germany.
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